We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.
Motivation
There is already a literature exploring the implications of deductive reasoning in extensive games, but the answers provided differ and the issue is controversial. Much of the excitement concerns whether or not deductive reasoning implies backward induction in games where that principle is applicable. We next discuss this issue, since it provides a useful backdrop against which to introduce and motivate our own approach.
Consider the 3-stage 'Take-it-or-leave-it', introduced by Reny (1993) (a version of Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game), and shown in Figure 1 together with its pure strategy reduced strategic form (PRSF).
1 What would 2 do in C 1 if called upon to play? Backward induction implies that 2 would choose d, which is consistent with the following idea: 2 chooses d because she 'figures out' that 1 would choose D at the last node. Many models of deductive reasoning support this story, starting with Bernheim's (1984) concept of 'subgame perfect rationalisability ' and Pearce's (1984) concept of 'extensive form rationalisability' (EFR). More recently, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) provide a rigorous epistemic foundation for EFR, and Aumann (1995) proposes an alternative epistemic model that also implies backward induction.
However, showing that backward induction can be given some kind of underpinning does not imply that the underpinning is convincing. Indeed, scepticism concerning backward induction can be expressed by means of C 1 . Suppose that each player believes that the opponent will play in accordance with backward induction; i.e., 1 believes that 2 chooses d if asked to play, and 2 believes that 1 plays D at his initial note. Then player 1 prefers playing D to any of his two other strategies FD and FF. Moreover, if 2 is certain that 1 believes that 2 chooses d if she were asked to play, then 2 realises that 1 has not chosen in accordance with his preferences if she after all is asked to play. Why then should 2 believe that 1 will make any particular choice between his two less preferred strategies, FD and FF, at his last node? So why then should 2 prefer d to f ?
This kind of perspective on the 'Take-it-or-leave-it' game is much inspired by the approach proposed by Ben-Porath (1997) , where similar objections against backward inductive reasoning are raised. We shall discuss his contribution in some detail, since the key features of our approach can be appreciated via a comparison to his model. Applied to C 1 , Ben-Porath's model captures the following intuition: each player has an initial belief about the opponent's behaviour. If this belief is contradicted by the play (a 'surprise' occurs) he may subsequently entertain any belief consistent with the path of play. The only restriction imposed on updated beliefs is Bayes' rule. In C 1 , Ben-Porath's model allows player 2 to make any choice. In particular, 2 may choose f if she initially believes with probability one that player 1 will choose D, and conditionally on D not being chosen assigns sufficient probability on FF. This entails that if 2 initially believes that 1 will comply with backward induction, then 2 need not follow backward induction herself.
In C 1 , our analysis captures much the same intuition as Ben-Porath's approach, and it has equal cutting power in this game. However, it yields a more structured solution as it is concerned with what strategy subsets that are deemed to be the set of rational choices for each player. While agreeing with Ben-Porath that deductive reasoning may lead to each of D and FD being rational for 1 and each of d and f being rational for 2, our concept of full permissibility predicts that 1's set of rational choices is either {D } or {D, F }, and 2's set of rational choices is either {d } or {d, f }. This has appealing features. If 2 is certain that 1's set is {D }, then -unless 2 
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has an assessment of the relative likelihood of 1's less preferred strategies FD and FF -one cannot conclude that 2 prefers d to f or vice versa; this justifies {d, f } as 2's set of rational choices. On the other hand, if 2 considers it possible that 1's set is {D, FD}, then d weakly dominates f on this set and justifies {d } as 2's set of rational choices. Similarly, one can justify that D is preferred to FD if and only if 1 considers it impossible that 2's set is {d, f }. This additional structure is important for the analysis of C 2 , illustrated in Figure 2 . This game is due to Reny (1992, Fig. 1 ) and has appeared in many contributions. Suppose in this game that each player believes that the opponent will play in accordance with backward induction by choosing FF and f respectively. Then both players will prefer FF and f to any alternative strategy. Moreover, as will be shown in Section 4.1, our analysis implies that {FF } and { f } are the unique sets of rational choices.
Ben-Porath's approach, by contrast, does not have such cutting power in C 2 , as it entails that deductive reasoning may lead to each of the strategies D and FF being rational for 1 and each of the strategies d and f being rational for 2. The intuition for why the strategies D and d are admitted is as follows: D is 1's unique best strategy if he believes with probability one that 2 plays d. Player 1 is justified in this belief in the sense that d is 2's best strategy if she initially believes with probability one that 1 will choose D, and if called upon to play 2 revises this belief so as to believe with sufficiently high probability (e.g., probability one) that 1 is using FD. This belief revision is consistent with Bayes' rule, and so is acceptable.
Ben-Porath's approach is a very important contribution to the literature, since it is a natural next step if one accepts the above critique of backward induction. Yet we shall argue below that it is too permissive, using C 2 as an illustration. The problem is that Ben-Porath does not impose certain reasonable constraints on how players reason about the likelihood of opponent choices. To see how our approach does impose such constraints, let us present the three key features of our modeling:
1. Caution. A player should prefer one strategy to another if the former weakly dominates the latter. Such admissibility of a player's preferences on the set of all opponent strategies is implicit in any procedure that starts out by eliminating all weakly dominated strategies. In extensive games, 'caution' ensures that each player takes into account any information set that is consistent with the player's own strategy. 2. Full belief of opponent rationality. A player should prefer one strategy to another if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of rational
1, 1 0 , 0 1, 1 3 , 3 2 1 Fig. 2 . C 2 and its PRSF choices for the opponent. Such admissibility of a player's preferences on a particular subset of opponent strategies is essentially satisfied by procedures, like EFR and 'iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies' (IEWDS), that promote forward induction. It is equivalent to deeming any opponent strategy that is a rational choice infinitely more likely, in the sense of Blume et al. (1991, Def. 5 .1), than any opponent strategy not having this property. 3. No extraneous restrictions on beliefs. A player should prefer one strategy to another only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the set of rational choices for the opponent. Such equal treatment of different opponent strategies that are all rationalor all irrational -have in principle been argued by Samuelson (1992 , p. 311), Gul (1997 ), and Mariotti (1997 .
A player's preferences over his own strategies, which depend on his payoff function and his beliefs about the opponent's choice, leads to a choice set (i.e., a set of maximal strategies). A player's preferences is said to be fully admissibly consistent with the preferences of his opponent if one strategy is preferred to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter
• on the union of opponent choice sets that are deemed possible, or • on the set of all opponent strategies, thereby satisfying the three key features presented above. A subset of strategies is a fully permissible set if and only if it can be a choice set when there is common certain belief of full admissible consistency, where an event is 'certainly believed' if the complement is deemed impossible (or more precisely: is Savage-null). Thus, this solution concept determines a collection of strategy subsets -a family of choice sets -for each player.
We can use C 2 of Figure 2 to illustrate the three key features. Assume that 1 deems d infinitely more likely than f, while 2 deems D infinitely more likely than FD and FD infinitely more likely than FF. Then the players rank their strategies as follows:
This is in fact precisely the justification of the strategies D and d given above when applying Ben-Porath's approach to C 2 . Here, 'caution' is satisfied since all opponent strategies are taken into account; in particular, FF is preferred to FD as the former strategy weakly dominates the latter. Moreover, 'full belief of opponent rationality' is satisfied since each player deems the opponent's maximal strategy infinitely more likely that any non-maximal strategy. However, the requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' is not satisfied since the preferences of 2 introduce extraneous restrictions on beliefs by deeming one of 1's non-maximal strategies, FD, infinitely more likely than another non-maximal strategy, FF. When we return to G 2 in Section 4.1, we show how the additional imposition of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' means that deductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that {FF } and { f } are the players' choice sets in this game.
In Section 2, the formal definition of the concept of fully permissible sets is reproduced from AD. The definition applies to games represented in strategic form. However, in Section 3 we prove results, drawing on work by Mailath et al. (1993) , that justify the claim that interesting implications of deductive reasoning in a given extensive game can be derived by applying the concept to the strategic form of that game.
Sections 4 and 5 are concerned with such applications, with the aim of showing how our solution concept gives new and economically relevant insights into the implications of deductive reasoning in extensive games. The material is organised around two central themes: backward and forward induction. Other support for forward induction through the concept of EFR and the procedure of IEWDS precludes outcomes in conflict with backward induction (Battigalli, 1997) . In contrast, we will show how the concept of fully permissible sets promotes forward induction in the 'Battle-of-the-Sexes-with-an-Outside-Option' and 'Burning Money' games as well as an economic application from organisation theory, while not insisting on the backward induction outcome in games (like C 1 and the 3-period prisoners' dilemma) where earlier contributions, like Basu (1990) , Reny (1993) and others, have argued on theoretical grounds that this is problematic. Still, we will show that the backward induction outcome is obtained in C 2 , and that our concept has considerable bite in the 3-period prisoners' dilemma game.
Lastly, in Section 6 we compare our approach to related work.
Concepts
Below we make a self-contained presentation of the concept of fully permissible sets, reproduced from AD. This definition is given in terms of an elimination procedure -iterative elimination of choice set under full admissible consistency (IECFA) -that iteratively eliminates strategy subsets that cannot be choice sets under full admissible consistency. In AD we also provide an epistemic characterisation of this procedure (as indicated in Section 1). Readers that are interested in details are referred to AD. In the present paper we will only apply the elimination procedure, although we will at some places interpret results in a way consistent with the underlying epistemic foundation. As the purpose here is to apply IECFA to extensive games, we start by introducing such games. We refer to standard texts for the general formalism of extensive games and state only those basic and derived notions that will be needed.
Extensive Games
A finite extensive game C (without nature) includes a set of players I 2 {1, 2} (we assume 2 players for convenience), a set of terminal nodes Z, and, for each player i, a vNM utility function t i : Z fi R that assigns payoff to any outcome. For any player i, there is a finite collection of information sets H i , with a finite set of actions A(h) being associated with each h 2 H i . A pure strategy for player i is a function s i that to any h 2 H i assigns an action in A(h). Let S i denote player i's finite set of pure strategies, and let S ¼ S 1 · S 2 . Write p i , r i and s i (2 S i ) for pure strategies and x i and 2003 ] 309
, where z is the terminal node reached when s ¼ (s 1 , s 2 ) is used, and refer to G ¼ (S 1 , S 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) as the strategic form of the extensive game C. Since u i is a vNM utility function, we may extend u i to mixed strategies:
h denote the set of strategy vectors for which h is reached. As C is a 2-player game with perfect recall, S h is rectangular:
Fully Permissible Sets
Each player i has preferences over his own strategies, which depend on u i and his beliefs about the strategy choice of his opponent. Player i's choice set is the set of pure strategies that are maximal w.r.t. i's preferences over his own strategies: s i (2 S i ) is in i's choice set if and only if there is no x i (2 D(S i )) such that x i is preferred to s i . For the class of preferences considered here, i's choice set is nonempty and supports any maximal mixed strategy (subsection 4.3 of AD). Let S 0 j ð S j Þ be a set of opponent strategies. Say that x i weakly dominates y i on S
, with strict inequality for some s j 2 S 0 j . Interpret Q j (˝S j ) as the set of strategies that player i deems to be the set of rational choices for his opponent. Assume that player i's preferences over his own strategies are given by: x i is preferred to y i if and only if x i weakly dominates y i on Q j or S j . Player i's choice set, C i (Q j ), is then equal to S i nD i (Q j ), where, for any ð; 6 ¼Þ Q j˝Sj ,
} denotes the collection of non-empty subsets of S i . Write p i , q i , and r i (2 R i ) for subsets of pure strategies. For any
, where
Hence, a i (N j ) is the collection of strategy subsets that can be choice sets for player i if i's preferences are characterised by the following property: one strategy is preferred to another if and only if the one weakly dominates the other either on the union of the strategy subsets in a non-empty subcollection of N j or on the set of all opponent strategies.
We can now define the concept of a fully permissible set.
Definition 1. Consider the sequence defined by Nð0Þ ¼ R and "g ! 1, NðgÞ ¼ a½N ðg À 1Þ. A non-empty strategy set p i is said to be a fully permissible set for i if
Let P ¼ P 1 · P 2 denote the collection of vectors of fully permissible sets. Since the game is finite, N(g) converges to P in a finite number of iterations. IECFA is the procedure that in round g eliminates sets in N(g ) 1)nN(g) as possible choice sets. A choice set of player i survives elimination round g if and only if it is a choice set w.r.t. preferences that are characterised by the following property: one strategy is preferred to another if and only if the one weakly dominates the other either on the union of some (or all) of opponent choice sets that have survived the procedure up till round g ) 1 or on the set of all opponent strategies. A fully permissible set is a choice set which will survive in this way for any g. It follows from the analysis of AD that strategy subsets that this algorithm has not eliminated by round g can be interpreted as choice sets that are compatible with g ) 1 order of mutual certain belief of full admissible consistency.
The algorithm of Definition 1 -IECFA -is an elimination procedure, and in this regard it is reminiscent of procedures that iteratively eliminates dominated strategies. However, IECFA does not eliminate strategies. Rather, it eliminates sets of strategies that cannot be choice sets under full admissible consistency. It is therefore that IECFA starts with each player's collection of all non-empty strategy subsets, and then iteratively eliminates subsets in this collection. It is important that the appropriate interpretation of IECFA in terms of surviving choice sets be borne in mind.
We reproduce from AD the following proposition, which characterises the strategy subsets that survive IECFA and thus are fully permissible.
Proposition 1(i) establishes existence, but not uniqueness, of each player's fully permissible set(s). Games with multiple strict Nash equilibria illustrate the possibility of such multiplicity; by Proposition 1(iii), any strict Nash equilibrium corresponds to a vector of fully permissible sets. Other (quite different) examples of games with multiple fully permissible sets are provided in Sections 4 and 5, namely C 1 , a 3-period prisoners' dilemma (C 3 ), and C 5 . Proposition 1(ii) means that P is a fixed point in terms of a collection of vectors of strategy sets. By Proposition 1(iii) it is the largest such fixed point.
Justifying Extensive Form Application
The concept of fully permissible sets, presented in Section 2 of the present paper and epistemically characterised in AD, is designed to analyse the implications of deductive reasoning in strategic form games. In this paper, we propose that this concept can be fruitfully applied for analysing any extensive game through its strategic form. In fact, we propose that it is legitimate to confine attention to the game's pure strategy reduced strategic form (Definition 2), which is computationally more convenient. In this Section we prove two results which, taken together, justify such applications.
Dynamic Consistency
Proposition 2 addresses the dynamic consistency problem inherent in applying AD's strategic form analysis to games with an explicit sequential structure. Consider any strategy that is maximal given preferences that satisfy that one strategy is preferred to another if and only if the one weakly dominates the other on Q j -the set of strategies that player i deems to be the set of rational choices for his opponent -or S j -the set of all opponent strategies. Hence, the strategy is maximal at the outset of a corresponding extensive game. We prove that this strategy is still maximal when the preferences have been updated upon reaching any information set that the choice of this strategy does not preclude.
Assume that player i's preferences over his own strategies are given by: x i is preferred to y i if and only if x i weakly dominates y i on Q j or S j . Let, for any h 2 H i , Q 
By the result below, if s i is maximal at the outset of an extensive game, then it is also maximal at later information sets for i that s i does not preclude. Mailath et al. (1993, Defs. 2 and 3 and the if-part of Theorem 1), S h is a strategically independent set for i. Hence,
By the assumption of 'caution', each player i takes into account the possibility of reaching any information set for i that the player's own strategy does not preclude from being reached.
Reduced Strategic Form
It follows from Proposition 3 that it is in fact sufficient to consider the pure strategy reduced strategic form when deriving the fully permissible sets of the game. The following definition is needed. Definition 2. Let r i , s i 2 S i . Then r i and s i are equivalent if, for each k 2 I, u k (r i , s j ) ¼ u k (s i , s j ) for all s j 2 S j . The pure strategy reduced strategic form (PRSF) of G is obtained by letting, for each i, each class of equivalent pure strategies be represented by exactly one pure strategy.
Since the maximality of one of two equivalent strategies implies that the other is maximal as well, the following observation holds: if r i and s i are equivalent and p i is a fully permissible set for i, then r i 2 p i if and only if s i 2 p i . To see this formally, note that if r i 2 p i for some fully permissible set p i , then, by Proposition 1(ii), there exists ð; 6 ¼ÞW j˝Pj such that r i 2 p i ¼ C i ([ r j 2W j r j ). Since r i and s i are equivalent,
This observation explains why the following result can be established.
Proposition 3. LetG G ¼ ðS S k ;ũ u k Þ k2I be a strategic form game where r i , s i 2S S i are two equivalent strategies for i. Consider G ¼ (S k , u k ) k 2 I , where S i ¼S S i nfr i g and S j ¼S S j for j " i, and where, for all k 2 I, u k is the restriction ofũ u k to S ¼ S 1 · S 2 . Let, for each k 2 I, P k ðP P k Þ denote the collection of fully permissible sets for k in G ðG GÞ. Then P i is obtained from P P i by removing r i from anyp p i 2P P i with s i 2p p i , while, for j 6 ¼ i; P j ¼P P j .
Proof. By Proposition 1(iii) it suffices to show that 1. IfÑ N aðÑ NÞ forG G, then N˝a(N) for G, where N i is obtained fromÑ N i by removing r i from anyp p i 2Ñ N i with s i 2p p i , while, for
Part 1. AssumeÑ N aðÑ NÞ. By the observation preceding Proposition 3, ifp p i 2P P i , then r i 2p p i if and only if s i 2p p i . Pick any k 2 I and anyp p k 2P P k . Let ' denote the other player. By the definition of a k (AE), there exists ð; 6 ¼ÞW W ' P P ' such that
Construct W i by removing r i from anyr r i 2W W i with s i 2r r i and replaceS S i by S i , while, for j " i, W j ¼W W j and S j ¼S S j . Then it follows from the de-
Since, "k 2 I, (; 6 ¼ÞW k˝Nk , we have that N˝a(N). Part 2 is shown similarly.
Proposition 3 means that the PRSF is sufficient for analysing common certain belief of full admissible consistency, which is the epistemic foundation for the concept of fully permissible sets. Consequently, in the strategic form of an extensive game, it is unnecessary to specify actions at information sets that a strategy precludes from being reached. Hence, instead of fully specified strategies, it is sufficient to consider what Rubinstein (1991) calls plans of action. For a generic extensive game, the set of plans of action is identical to the strategy set in the PRSF.
In the following two sections we apply the concept of fully permissible sets to extensive games. We organise the discussion around two themes: backward and forward induction. Motivated by Propositions 2 and 3, we analyse each extensive game via its PRSF (Definition 2), given in conjunction to the extensive form. In each example, each plan of action that appears in the underlying extensive game corresponds to a distinct strategy in the PRSF.
Backward Induction
Does deductive reasoning in extensive games imply backward induction? In this Section we show that the answer provided by the concept of fully permissible sets is 'sometimes, but not always'.
'Sometimes'
There are many games where Ben-Porath's approach does not capture backward induction while our approach does (and the converse is not true). Ben-Porath (1997) assumes 'initial common certainty of rationality' (initial CCR) in extensive games with perfect information. He proves that in generic games (with no payoff ties at terminal nodes for any player) the outcomes consistent with that assumption coincide with those that survive the Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) procedure (where one round of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies is followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies).
It is a general result that the concept of fully permissible sets refines the Dekel and Fudenberg procedure (see AD, Proposition 3.2). Game C 2 of Figure 2 shows that the refinement may be strict even for generic extensive games with perfect information, and indeed that fully permissible sets may respect backward induction where Ben-Porath's solution does not. The strategies surviving the DekelFudenberg procedure, and thus consistent with initial CCR, are D and FF for player 1 and d and f for player 2. In Section 1 we gave an intuition for why the strategies D and d are possible. This is, however, at odds with the implications of common certain belief of full admissible consistency. Applying IECFA to the PRSF of C 2 yields:
Nð1Þ ¼ ffDg; fFF g; fD; FF gg Â R 2 Nð2Þ ¼ ffDg; fFF g; fD; FF gg Â fff g; fd; f gg Nð3Þ ¼ ffFF g; fD; FF gg Â fff g; fd; f gg Nð4Þ ¼ ffFF g; fD; FF gg Â fff gg P ¼ Nð5Þ ¼ ffFF gg Â fff gg:
Interpretation: N(1): 'Caution' implies that FD cannot be a maximal strategy (i.e., an element of a choice set) for 1 since it is weakly dominated (in fact, even strongly dominated). N(2): Player 2 certainly believes that only {D}, {FF } and {D, FF } are candidates for 1's choice set. By 'full belief of opponent rationality' and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' this excludes {d } as 2's choice set, since d weakly dominates f only on {FD} or {D, FD}. N(3): 1 certainly believes that only { f } and {d, f } are candidates for 2's choice set. By 'full belief of opponent rationality' and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' this excludes {D} as 1's choice set, since D weakly dominates FD and FF only on {d }. N(4): Player 2 certainly believes that only {FF } and {D, FF } are candidates for 1's choice set. By 'full belief of opponent rationality' this implies that 2's choice set is { f } since f weakly dominates d on both {FF } and {D,FF }. N(5): 1 certainly believes that 2's choice set is { f }. By 'full belief of opponent rationality' this implies that {FF } is 1's choice set since FF weakly dominates D on { f }. No further elimination of choice sets is possible, so {FF } and { f } are the respective players' unique fully permissible sets.
'Not Always'
While fully permissible sets capture backward induction in C 2 and other games, the concept does not capture backward induction in certain games where the procedure has been considered controversial.
2 Much of the controversy centres on the following paradoxical aspect: Why should a player believe that an opponent's future play will satisfy backward induction if the opponent's previous play is incompatible with backward induction? A prototypical game for casting doubt on backward induction is the take-it-or-leave-it game C 1 , which we next analyse in detail.
Applying our algorithm IECFA to the PRSF of C 1 of Figure 1 yields:
Nð1Þ ¼ ffDg; fFDg; fD; FDgg Â R 2 Nð2Þ ¼ ffDg; fFDg; fD; FDgg Â ffdg; fd; f gg P ¼ Nð3Þ ¼ ffDg; fD; FDgg Â ffdg; fd; f gg:
Interpretation: N(1): FF cannot be a maximal strategy for 1 since it is strongly dominated. N(2): Player 2 certainly believes that only {D}, {FD} and {D, FD} are candidates for 1's choice set. This excludes { f } as 2's choice set since { f } is 2's choice set only if 2 deems {FF } or {D, FF } possible. N(3): 1 certainly believes that only {d } and {d, f } are candidates for 2's choice set, implying that {FD} cannot be 1's choice set. No further elimination of choice sets is possible and the collection of vectors of fully permissible sets is as specified.
Note that backward induction is not implied. To illustrate why, we focus on player 2 and explain why {d, f } may be a choice set for her. Player 2 certainly believes that 1's choice set is {D} or {D, FD}. This leaves room for two basic cases. First, suppose 2 deems {D, FD} possible. Then {d } must be her choice set, since she must consider it infinitely more likely that 1 uses FD than that he uses FF. Second, and more interestingly, suppose 2 does not deem {D, FD} possible. Then conditional on 2's node being reached 2 certainly believes that 1 is not choosing a maximal strategy. As player 2 does not assess the relative likelihood of strategies that are not maximal (the requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'), {d, f } is her choice set in this case. Note that even in the case when 2 deems {D} to be the only possible choice set for 1, she still considers it possible that 1 may choose one of his non-maximal strategies FD and FF (the requirement of 'caution'), although each of these strategies is in this case deemed infinitely less likely than the unique maximal strategy D.
Applied to (the PRSF of) C 1 , our concept permits two fully permissible sets for each player. How can this multiplicity of fully permissible sets be interpreted? The following interpretation corresponds to the underlying formalism: the concept of fully permissible sets, when applied to C 1 , allows for two different 'types' of each player. Consider player 2. Either she may consider that {D, FD} is a possible choice set for 1, in which case her choice set will be {d } so that she complies with backward induction. Or she may consider {D} to be the only possible choice set for 1, in which case 2's choice set is {d, f }. Intuitively, if 2 is certain that 1 is a backward inducter, then 2 need not be a backward inducter herself! In this game, our model captures an intuition that is very similar to that of Ben-Porath's model. Reny (1993) defines a class of 'belief consistent' games, and argues on epistemic grounds that backward induction is problematic only for games that are not in this class. It is interesting to note that the game (C 2 ) where our concept of fully permissible sets differs from Ben-Porath's analysis by promoting backward induction, is belief-consistent. In contrast, the game (C 1 ) where the present concept coincides with his by not yielding backward induction, is not belief-consistent. There are examples of games that are not belief consistent, where full permissibility still implies backward induction, meaning that belief consistency is not necessary for this conclusion. It is, however, an as-yet unproven conjecture that belief consistency is sufficient for the concept of fully permissible sets to promote backward induction.
We now compare our results to the very different findings of Aumann (1995) (Stalnaker, 1998, Sect. 5) . In Aumann's model, where it is crucial to specify full strategies (rather than plans of actions), common knowledge of rational choice implies in C 1 that all strategies for 1 but DD (where he takes a payoff of 1 at his first node and a payoff of 3 at his last node) are impossible. Hence, it is impossible for 1 to play FD or FF and thereby ask 2 to play. However, in the counterfactual event that 2 is asked to play, she optimises as if player 1 at his last node follows his only possible strategy DD, implying that it is impossible for 2 to choose f (Aumann's Sections 4b, 5b, and 5c). Thus, in Aumann's analysis, if there is common knowledge of rational choice, then each player chooses the backwards induction strategy. By contrast, in our analysis player 2 being asked to play is seen to be incompatible with 1 playing DD or DF. For the determination of 2's preference over her strategies it is the relative likelihood of FD versus FF that is important to her. As seen above, this assessment depends on whether she deems {D, FD} as a possible candidate for 1's choice set.
Prisoners' Dilemma
We close this section by considering a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game. Such a game does not have perfect information, but it can still be solved by backward induction to find the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (no one cooperates in the last period, given this no one cooperates in the penultimate period etc.). This solution has been taken to be counterintuitive (Pettit and Sugden, 1989) . We consider the case of a 3-period prisoners' dilemma game (C 3 ) and show that, again, the concept of fully permissible sets does not capture backward induction. However, the fully permissible sets nevertheless have considerable cutting power. Our solution refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and generates some special 'structure' on the choice sets that survive.
The payoffs of the stage game are given as follows, using Aumann's (1987, pp. 468-9) description: each player decides whether he will receive 1 (defect) or the other will receive 3 (cooperate). There is no discounting. Hence, the action defect is strongly dominant in the stage game, but still, each player is willing to cooperate in one stage if this induces the other player to cooperate instead of defect in the next stage. It follows from Proposition 3 that we need only consider, what Rubinstein (1991) and s RE i , where N denotes that i is nice in the sense of cooperating in the 1st stage, where R denotes that i is rude in the sense of defecting in the 1st stage, where T denotes that i plays tit-for-tat in the sense of cooperating in the 2nd stage if and only j " i has cooperated in the 1st stage, where V denotes that i plays inverse tit-for-tat in the sense of defecting in the 2nd stage if and only if j " i has cooperated in the 1st stage, and where E denotes that i is exploitive in the sense of defecting in the 2nd stage independently of what j " i has played in the 1st stage. The strategic form after elimination of all other plans of actions is given in Figure 3 . Note that none of these plans of actions are weakly dominated in the full strategic form. AD (Proposition 3.2) show that any fully permissible set is a subset of the set of strategies surviving the Dekel and Fudenberg procedure. Hence, only subsets of fs is a maximal strategy, Given that the choice set of the opponent satisfies these conditions, this implies that
is included in i's choice set, only the following sets are candidates for i's choice set: fs 6, 2 9, 1 6, 2 2, 6 5, 5 2, 6
6, 2 9, 1 6, 2 3, 3 6, 2 3, 3 4, 8 
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• if s While play in accordance with strategies surviving the Dekel and Fudenberg procedure does not provide any prediction other than both players defecting in the 3rd stage, the concept of fully permissible sets has more bite. In particular, a player cooperates in the 2nd stage only if the opponent has cooperated in the 1st stage. This implies that only the following paths can be realised if players choose strategies in fully permissible sets: That the path ((cooperate, defect), (cooperate, defect), (defect, defect)) or v.v. cannot be realised if players choose strategies in fully permissible sets can be interpreted as an indication that the present analysis seems to produce some element of reciprocity in the 3-period prisoners' dilemma game.
Forward Induction
AD analyse the 'Battle-of-the-Sexes-with-an-Outside-Option' (BoSwOO) game (introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982) who credit Elon Kohlberg) and the 'Burning money' game (van Damme 1989, Figure 5; Ben-Porath and Dekel 1992, Figure 1.2) in the strategic form and show how the concept of fully permissible sets yields forward induction outcomes. Here we consider extensive form versions of these games, then analyse a modification of BoSwOO due to Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) , and finally consider an economic application from organisation theory.
Battle-of-the-Sexes With Variations
We start with BoSwOO (cf. C 4 of Figure 4) . Applying IECFA to the PRSF of C 4 yields:
Nð2Þ ¼ ffX g; fBg; fX ; Bgg Â ffbg; fb; sgg Nð3Þ ¼ ffBg; fX ; Bgg Â ffbg; fb; sgg Nð4Þ ¼ ffBg; fX ; Bgg Â ffbgg
The profile (B, b) corresponds to the usual forward induction outcome. Propositions 2 and 3 together is our justification for claiming that common certain belief of full admissible consistency captures forward induction in the same way in any extensive game underlying the PRSF of C 4 .
Analogous remarks apply to the Burning money game -which depicts a situation where a 'Battle-of-the-Sexes' game is preceded by an opportunity for one player to 'waste a unit of payoff ' (see, e.g., Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) for a more detailed discussion) -but with a twist. The player who cannot burn money will have two strategies in her unique fully permissible set; at the information set reached if money is burnt a maximal strategy may prescribe any action. By contrast IEWDSthe usual route to forward induction outcomes -permits only one specific action. This has been taken, as troublesome as it may seem, to suggest that burning is viewed as a 'signal of a rational player's intentions', despite burning in the end being an action a rational player would never use. Our solution of the Burning money game is robust to this critique. See AD for more discussion and details.
We next turn now to a game introduced by Dekel and Fudenberg (1990, Fig. 7 .1), which is discussed also by Hammond (1993) , and which is reproduced here as C 5 of Figure 5 . It is a modification of C 4 which introduces an 'extra outside option' for player 2. In this game there may seem to be a tension between forward and backward induction: For player 2 not to choose x may seem to suggest that 2 'signals' that she seeks a payoff of at least 3/2, in contrast to the payoff of 1 that she gets when the subgame structured like C 4 is considered in isolation (as seen in the analysis of C 4 ). However, this intuition is not quite supported by the concept of fully permissible sets. Applying our algorithm IECFA to the PRSF of C 5 yields:
Nð1Þ ¼ ffX g; fBg; fX ; Bgg Â ffxg; fsg; fx; bg; fx; sg; fb; sg; fx; b; sgg Nð2Þ ¼ ffX g; fBg; fX ; Bgg Â ffxg; fx; bg; fb; sgg Nð3Þ ¼ ffBg; fX ; Bgg Â ffxg; fx; bg; fb; sgg P ¼ Nð4Þ ¼ ffBg; fX ; Bgg Â ffxg; fx; bgg:
The only way for X to be a maximal strategy for player 1 is that he deems {x} as the only possible candidate for 2's choice set, in which case 1's choice set is {X,B}. Else {B} is 1's choice set. Furthermore, 2 can have a choice set different from {x} only if she deems {X, B} as a possible candidate for 1's choice set. Intuitively this means that if 2's choice set differs from {x} (i.e., equals {x, b}), then she deems it possible that 1 considers it impossible that b is a maximal strategy for 2. Since it is only under such circumstances that b is a maximal element for 2, perhaps this strategy is better thought of in terms of 'strategic manipulation' than in terms of 'forward induction'. Note that the concept of fully permissible sets has more bite than the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure; in addition to the strategies appearing in fully permissible sets also s survives the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure.
An Economic Application
Finally, we apply the concept of fully permissible sets to an economic model from organisation theory. Schotter (2000, ch. 8 ) discusses incentives schemes for firms and the moral hazard problems that may plague them. 'Revenue-sharing contracts', for example, often invite free-riding behaviour by the workers, and so lead to inefficient outcomes. However, Schotter points to 'forcing contracts' -incentive schemes of a kind introduced by Holmström (1982) -as a possible remedy: each worker is paid a bonus if and only if the collective of workers achieve a certain level of total production. If incentives are set right, then there is a symmetric and efficient Nash equilibrium in which each worker exerts a substantial effort. Each worker avoids shirking because he feels that his role is 'pivotal', believing that any reduction in effort leads to a loss of the bonus. However, forcing contracts are often problematic in that there typically exists a Nash equilibrium in which no worker exerts any effort at all. How serious is this problem? Schotter offers the following argument in support of the forcing-contract (p. 302): 'While the no-work equilibrium for the forcing-contract game does indeed exist, it is unlikely that we will ever see this equilibrium occur. If workers actually accept such a contract and agree to work under its terms, we must conclude that they intend to exert the necessary effort and that they expect their coworkers to do the same. Otherwise, they would be better off obtaining a job elsewhere at their opportunity wage and not wasting their time pretending that they will work hard. ' Schotter appeals to intuition, but his argument has a forward induction flavour to it. We now show how the concept of fully permissible sets lends support. Consider the following situation involving a forcing contract: a firm needs two workers to operate. The workers simultaneously choose shirking at zero cost of effort, or high effort at cost c > 0. They get a bonus b > c if and only if both workers choose high effort. As indicated above, this situation can be modelled as a game with two Nash equilibria (S, s) and (H, h), where (H, h) Pareto-dominates (S, s). However, let this game be a subgame of a larger game. In line with Schotter's intuitive discussion, add a preceding stage where each worker simultaneously decides whether to indicate willingness to join the firm with the forcing contract, or to work elsewhere at opportunity wage w, 0 < w < b ) c. The firm with the forcing contract is established if and only if both workers indicate willingness to join it. This situation is depicted by the extensive game C 6 . Again, we analyse the PRSF (Figure 6 ). Application of IECFA yields:
Nð1Þ ¼ ffX g; fH g; fX ; H gg Â ffxg; fhg; fx; hgg Nð2Þ ¼ ffH g; fX ; H gg Â ffhg; fx; hgg P ¼ Nð3Þ ¼ ffH gg Â ffhgg:
Interpretation: N(1): Shirking cannot be a maximal strategy for either worker since it is weakly dominated. N(2): This excludes the possibility that a worker's choice set contains only the outside option. N(3): Since each worker certainly believes that hard work is, while shirking is not, an element of the opponent's choice set, it follows that each worker deems it infinitely more likely that the opponent chooses hard work rather than shirking. This means that, for each worker, only hard work is in his choice set, a conclusion that supports Schotter's argument.
Discussion
Here we have explored the implications of AD's concept of fully permissible sets in extensive games. AD characterise this concept as choice sets under common certain belief of full admissible consistency. Full admissible consistency entails that one strategy is preferred to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent, or on the set of all opponent strategies. Samuelson (1992) also presents an epistemic analysis of admissibility that leads to a collection of choice sets for each player. He requires that a player's choice set equals the set of strategies that are not weakly dominated on the union of choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent, implying that our requirement of 'caution' is not imposed. Moreover, he defines possibility relative to a knowledge operator that satisfies the truth axiom, while we -in our analysis -allow a player to deem an opponent choice set to be impossible (or more precisely, Savage-null) even when it is the true choice set of the opponent. For example, in the 'Take-it-orleave-it' game (C 1 ) our analysis includes a type of player 2 who deems it impossible for player 1 to have the choice set {D, FD} even when this is the true choice set of player 1. This explains why we in contrast to Samuelson obtain general existence (Proposition 1(i)). Battigalli (1996) has shown how Pearce's (1984) EFR corresponds to the 'best rationalisation principle'. This implies that some opponent strategies are neither completely rational nor completely irrational, but are considered to be at intermediate degrees of rationality. The present analysis, in contrast, differentiates only between whether a strategy is maximal (i.e., a rational choice) or not. In particular, although a strategy that is weakly dominated on the set of all opponent strategies is a 'stupid' choice, it need not be more 'stupid' than any remaining admissible strategy, as this depends on the interactive analysis of the game. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) have provided an interesting epistemic foundation for EFR. As discussed in AD, there are several differences between their model and the epistemic analysis we present in our companion paper. 3 However, the fact that Battigalli and Siniscalchi present an epistemic model for extensive games in contrast to the strategic form analysis of AD is of less importance for the applicability to extensive games than it might appear. The reason is that Battigalli and Siniscalchi consider rational choice only at information sets that are not precluded from being reached by the player's own strategy. This corresponds exactly to the implication of AD's analysis when 'caution' is imposed (Proposition 2 of the present paper).
This latter observation is related to the fact that our requirement of 'full belief of opponent rationality' is concerned with strategy choices of the opponent in the whole game only, not with choices among the remaining available strategies at each and every information set. To illustrate this point, look back at C 1 and consider a type of player 2 who deems {D} as the only possible choice set for 1. Conditional on 2's node being reached it is clear that 1 cannot be choosing a strategy that is maximal given his preferences. Conditional on 2's node being reached, our modelling then imposes no constraint on 2's assessment of likelihood concerning which nonmaximal strategy FF or FD that 1 has chosen. This crucially presumes that 2 assesses the likelihood of different strategies as chosen by player 1 in the whole game.
It is possible to model players being concerned with opponent choices at all information sets. In C 1 this would amount to the following when player 2 is of a type who deems {D} as the only possible choice set for 1: conditional on 2's node being reached she realises that 1 cannot be choosing a strategy which is maximal given his preferences. Still, 2 considers it infinitely more likely that 1 at his last node chooses a strategy that is maximal among his remaining available strategies given his conditional preferences at that node. In Section 1 we argued, with Ben-Porath (1997) , that it is not intuitively clear that this is reasonable, a view which permeates the working hypotheses on which the current work in grounded. Yet, the alternative approach is logically conceivable, and research on this basis is illuminating and worthwhile. However, contributions that to go in this alternative direction 4 appear to promote concepts that imply backward induction without yielding forward induction, and thus lead to implications that are significantly different from those of the present paper. 
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